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Following the negative results of the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional
Treaty, the European Council has called for a "period of reflection" before reviewing the
situation in 2006. This period may last several years, but steps should be taken now to
respond to what has happened. The process by which a Convention would draft a
Constitutional Treaty, which would then be ratified in many cases by referendum, was
hoped to secure public consent to the basic rules and procedures of the European Union.
The referendums highlighted different reasons why this has not worked: lack of information
or understanding; contradicting or misplaced perceptions of what is at stake; perhaps an
inherent unsuitability of referendums for issues of this scale and complexity. The next steps
should aim to allow citizens to give their informed consent to the basic reasons, rules and
procedures involved, and then to place their trust in representative democracy and other
mechanisms of accountability. A new "permissive consensus" is more appropriate than
pursuing "direct democracy" over details in a Union of half a billion people. Three lines of
action suggest themselves. The first is to develop effective communications strategies and
educational programmes. The second is to go ahead with a few changes foreseen as a
demonstration exercise in the logic of European integration and a "model debate" to
engage the public: these could be the transformation of the EU's provisions concerning
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, and the role of parliaments in the EU.
Finally, the idea should be explored of seeking a reasoned popular mandate by some sort
of European Declaration of Principles, adopted simultaneously in each Member State,
which would serve as a mandate for detailed negotiations between governments and
subsequent monitoring by national parliaments.
Introduction
To lose one ratification referendum is a misfortune which
has occurred on two previous occasions in the European
Union and has been reversed. To lose two, as has happened
in 2005, starts to seem like carelessness, and may not be
so easily dealt with.
The negative outcomes in France on 29 May 2005 and
in The Netherlands on 1 June have frozen the process of
ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe. The European Council on 16-17 June called for a
period of reflection before reviewing the situation in the first
half of 2006. There is already a widespread feeling,
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however, that the Constitutional Treaty is dead in its present
form. The period of reflection will almost certainly last
several years. What should be done in the meantime?
There will be voices urging a re-run of the failed
referendums, although this would probably have to wait in
all events until the current leaders have gone, which means
2007. Some may also try to use this to kill two birds with one
stone. In August, Austrian Chancellor Schüssel – who will
have to start formally picking up the pieces during the
Austrian Presidency in the first half of 2006, and who has
also, like President Chirac, promised that Turkish accession
would be subject to a national referendum – seemed to
suggest telling French and Dutch voters that the lesson has
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been learnt and Turkey will not be let in, this being
presumed to change enough minds to permit ratification.1
This is not a good response. There is nothing in the
Constitutional Treaty which concerns Turkish accession
and, although negative attitudes to the possible accession
of Turkey certainly affected public opinion, this was not the
main reason for the No in either country.
What happens now matters greatly. What is done will
have a strong impact on public opinion not only in France
and The Netherlands but across the whole EU, especially in
the several countries where planned referendums have
been suspended. To put it bluntly, the credibility is at stake
of the whole notion of citizens' participation in the decision-
making processes of European integration. The first elections
to the enlarged European Parliament in June 2004 saw a
further drop in turnout to 45.7%. Now the populations of
two founding members of the Union have said No to a
major treaty change.
This article aims to contribute to reflection. It is argued
that the EU needs to devise more effective campaigns to
increase public understanding. In particular, one should
select a few issues of high pan-European saliency where EU
action can be demonstrated to provide "added value".
Beyond this, more fundamental rethinking is called for
regarding the possibility and desirability of direct parti-
cipation by citizens in EU decisions. The article concludes
that the main priority should rather be to consolidate a new
"permissive consensus" by which citizens give their informed
consent to the basic reasons and rules of the European
game – and then place their trust (together with some
reliable guarantees of accountability) in the mechanisms of
representative democracy. A few recommendations are
offered, finally, as to what this might mean in practice.
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Source: compiled from data in Flash Barometer EB 171, The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France.  June 2005;
and  Flash Barometer EB 172, The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in The Netherlands. June 2005.
T T T T Table 1 able 1 able 1 able 1 able 1
R R R R Reasons Given for V easons Given for V easons Given for V easons Given for V easons Given for Voting No in the F oting No in the F oting No in the F oting No in the F oting No in the French and Dutch R rench and Dutch R rench and Dutch R rench and Dutch R rench and Dutch Referendums, 2005 eferendums, 2005 eferendums, 2005 eferendums, 2005 eferendums, 2005
(Percentages of respondents indicating this as one of their reasons for a negative vote)
Reason France Netherlands
Negative employment effects 31 7
Weak economic situation in country 26 5
Economically speaking, the draft is too liberal 19 5
I am against the Bolkestein directive 2 ---
Not enough social Europe 16 2
Not democratic enough 3 5
Too complex 12 5
Too technocratic/juridical/too much regulation 2 6
I do not see what is positive in this text 4 6
Loss of national sovereignty 5 19
Loss of Dutch identity --- 3
I do not want a political union/federal State/"United States" of Europe 2 5
I am against Europe/European construction/European integration 4 8
The draft goes too far/ advances too quickly 3 6
This Constitution is imposed on us --- 5
Europe is evolving too fast --- 5
I do not trust Brussels --- 4
The draft does not go far enough 1 ---
Opposition to further enlargement 3 6
Does not want Turkey in the European Union 6 3
Europe is too expensive --- 13
There is nothing on human rights or on animal rights --- 2
Lack of information 5 32
The "Yes" campaign was not convincing enough --- 5
Influenced by the "No" campaign --- 2
Opposes president/national government/certain political parties 18 14
The Netherlands must first settle its own problems --- 4
Other 21 7
[DK/NA] 32E
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Why did they vote No?
All sorts of reasons lay behind the negative votes (see Table
1). A few had nothing to do with Europe. Several had little
to do directly with the Treaty but were certainly about
Europe. Interestingly, the main concerns were quite different
in the two countries.
Many Dutch objected to the process, merging a
perception of inadequate information with sensitivities
about national sovereignty and identity, as well as a feeling
of being pushed around. The main issue was the felt lack
of meaningful participation, in the referendum itself and in
Europe generally.
Many French, on the other hand, were afraid of the
outcome, seeing the Treaty as an excessively liberal threat
to employment which would undermine the (French) social
model. The main issue was, at least in the minds of the Non-
sayers, one of policy choice.
The following sections reflect on these two dimensions
of the problem, not in order to look more closely at specific
circumstances in The Netherlands and France, but to
contribute to thinking about how best one can reframe the
issues next time round.
Information and interest
In The Netherlands a lack of information was the single
reason most often given for voting against the Treaty. For
many Dutch, this seems to have become a source of active
resentment at not being taken seriously. People had not
been consulted over the introduction of the Euro or the
enlargement of the Union. They were now being asked to
give their approval to a long and complex document
without knowing either what this would change in the
present situation or what the consequences would be of not
adopting it. More material
concerns, notably the fact
(well-publicised in the coin-
cident debates on the EU's
Financial Perspective) that
the Dutch are now the
highest net contributors per
capita to the EU budget,
only made things worse by
creating the feeling that they
are also paying too much
for whatever it is they don't
know about.
Even where the referen-
dum results were positive,
there were grounds for con-
cern. In Spain (as in France) the lack of information also
seems to have been an important factor, especially among
younger people, but more in shaping decisions whether or
not to vote. There was indeed a low turnout (42%) in the
Spanish referendum in February, while in Luxembourg,
where voting is obligatory, the Yes vote was only 57% in the
referendum held in July.
A common first response to this situation is to lament the
failure of public campaigns in improving awareness and
understanding. In other words, it is assumed that it is not
only desirable but possible for most citizens to be able to
make an informed decision about the content of a
Constitutional Treaty. And it is also assumed, more of less
explicitly, that if citizens did understand, they would be in
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favour. The main point in all events is that there has been
a failure in communications.
It is obviously true that the importance of improving
public interest and understanding regarding European
integration – especially if one chooses to hold referendums
about it – is not new. It has been high on the formal agenda
ever since the Danish No in June 1992 first brought home
the demise of the old "permissive consensus". Yet little
seems to have been achieved. The Nice summit in December
2000 adopted a Declaration calling for
"a deeper and wider debate about the future of the
European Union. In 2001, the Swedish and Belgian
Presidencies, in cooperation with the Commission and
involving the European Parliament, will encourage wide-
ranging discussions with all interested parties: repre-
sentatives of national parliaments and all those reflecting
public opinion, namely political, economic and university
circles, representatives of civil society, etc."
Each Member State and candidate country was encouraged
to carry out a national campaign. Efforts were certainly made.
Yet one year was inevitably too short a time – even if adequate
resources and commitment had been devoted in all countries
– to bring about any broad and deep change in popular
understanding of the workings and rationale of the EU.
The European Convention which worked in 2002 and
2003 was an innovation in broadening the set of actors
involved in preparing treaty changes. It should also, it was
hoped, increase public interest. Yet the various efforts at
consultation were described later even by one Convention
official as "a 'gallant' failure, which pleased the lobbies but
failed to get through to the general public".2 Indeed,
according to a Eurobarometer survey in June 2003, only
45% of respondents across Europe had even heard of the
Convention.
Once the Intergovern-
mental Conference even-
tually agreed a text in 2004,
referendums were promi-
sed in nearly half the Mem-
ber States, even where they
were not mandatory, thus
hopefully putting a further
seal of democratic approval
on a text which would serve
as the basic law of the en-
larged Union in the coming
decades. The first results
have spoken for them-
selves.
There is certainly much more that could have been done
to make the Treaty comprehensible. The last thing that
needed to be done was again to hand out the whole text
(even at football matches in the Spanish case). Euro-
barometer in fact openly criticised the Spanish efforts.
"The Spanish experience appears to expose certain
errors or erroneous campaign strategies. Information is,
according to the data, a key element in mobilising
voters, and in this case it has not been communicated in
a valid or efficient manner by the parties and official
institutions…[It] shows that in order to mobilise citizens
there is a need for sustainable effort in informing and
encouraging debate on the Constitution."3
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All sorts of reasons lay
behind the negative votes.
A few had nothing to do
with Europe. Several had
little to do directly with the
Treaty but were certainly
about Europe.E
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It is easy to feel that there has been a lack of serious efforts
to engage the public in anything resembling serious debate
about European integration over the last few years, especially
when one considers the importance of the changes taking
place in Europe. It cannot be a matter of funding. It is
sometimes suggested that national governments may have
mixed incentives. They should have the duty as well as the
interest to explain why they have negotiated (and parliaments
agreed to) the present arrangements. "Brussels", however,
is much too useful as a scapegoat for difficult policies to risk
being lost through too much popular understanding as to
how decisions are actually taken.
Yet things are not so simple. It is not obvious how
governments could do better in short-term publicity
campaigns. Greater public understanding of the nature
and operation of the EU can only come about as a result of
sustained efforts through educational systems, social and
economic organisations and so on – and efforts which try
to explain not just a particular Treaty, but the broader issues
of European integration which may make it possible to
understand roughly what is going on and why.
More broadly, information is simply not enough. There
is a deeper challenge of provoking public interest. Indeed
the European Council of June 2005 emphasised precisely
this apparent lack of popular "interest", rather than of
information, understanding or support.
"This period of reflection will be used to enable a broad
debate to take place in each of our countries, involving
citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments
and political parties. This debate, designed to generate
interest, which is already under way in many Member
States, must be intensified and broadened." (emphasis
added)
European affairs do seem to be specifically disadvantaged
when it comes to public interest. It is not possible simply to
argue that the low turnouts in European elections (or in the
Spanish referendum) are part of a broader disillusion and
apathy about politics. It is true that the lower levels of youth
participation in all political processes compared to older
citizens is a broader phenomenon. It is also true that there
is necessarily a connection between European and national
levels. Since people vote almost exclusively for national (or
regional) political parties in European elections, turnout
must partly reflect perceptions of the national political
actors. Thus, in the Eurobarometer survey on the 2004
European elections, only 50% of respondents across EU 25
gave a positive response to the question "Do you feel close
to any one of the political parties?" The fact that turnout was
in general so much lower in the newer Member States
seems to be reflected in the fact that the average positive
response in EU 15 was 53% and in the ten new Member
States only 33%.4  Yet overall there is a notably higher level
of non-participation in European voting. Turnout in the
2004 European elections was lower than turnout in the
latest national elections in every single country of the 25
except Luxembourg.5 Eurobarometer itself noted that the
low 2004 participation reflected a conscious decision by
citizens to abstain in the European elections as compared
to national elections.6  Why is this so? Some argue that
"… this is not – as the deliberative critique implies –
because they believe that their participation is ineffective
or that institutions like the EP are unimportant. Institutions
are not the problem. One is forced to conclude that it is
because they do not care. Why are they apathetic? The
most plausible reason for such apathy is that the scope
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T T T T Table 2 able 2 able 2 able 2 able 2
R R R R Reasons Given for F easons Given for F easons Given for F easons Given for F easons Given for Failing to V ailing to V ailing to V ailing to V ailing to Vote in the 2004 European Elections ote in the 2004 European Elections ote in the 2004 European Elections ote in the 2004 European Elections ote in the 2004 European Elections
If you do not go to vote, this will be because: % Yes
You believe your vote will not change anything 58
You believe the EP does not sufficiently deal with problems that concern you 55
You do not sufficiently know the role of the European Parliament 52
Your do not feel you are sufficiently represented by the Members of the EP 52
You believe that you are not sufficiently informed to go to vote 51
You are not interested in the European elections 42
You are not interested in politics, by elections in general 39
You are not interested in European affairs 34
You believe that the European Parliament does not have enough power 34
You believe that you will be held up, due to travelling, work, health etc. 31
You never vote 23
You are against Europe, the EU, the European construction 21
You are not registered on the electoral lists 20
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 161. European elections 2004 barometer. Vol.1E
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of EU regulatory activity tends to be inversely correlated
with the importance of issues in the minds of European
voters. Of the five most salient issues in European
societies today – health care, education, law and order,
pension and social security policy, and taxes – none is
primarily an EU competence."7
It is true that only 30% of respondents in France and 26%
in The Netherlands said that their non-participation in the
2005 referendums was due to a belief that their vote would
not change anything. These, however, were rather specific
procedures with visible results in which individual votes
clearly would matter. At a broader level, it is not at all so
clear (from the Eurobarometer data, at least) that this
feeling is unimportant. The
survey published in July
2005 indicates that an
average of 53% feel that
their voice "does not count"
in the EU.8  The main reason
given for failing to vote in
the 2004 European elec-
tions was precisely the belief
that participation would be
ineffective (see Table 2).
This was, however, very clo-
sely followed by a feeling
that the issues involved were
not of primary concern and
it remains true that Europe
is not widely associated
(rightly or wrongly) with the
issues of most immediate
concern to citizens.
There may be some-
thing of a dilemma in this
respect. Unless there is
interest, little effort will be
made to understand what
is at stake. Unless some-
thing important is felt to be
at stake, there will be little interest. As Eurobarometer
argued, "by insisting on the issues at stake in the European
elections and their consequences on daily life, it should be
possible to increase participation in elections."9 Yet caution
is required. As the French case has shown, the real issues
at stake may not be clear, and there may be disagreements
within and between countries about the very nature of the
exercise.
Stakes and choices
In France, the main reasons for voting against the Con-
stitutional Treaty concerned the economic situation,
employment and social rights (see Table 1). Europe seemed
to be moving further away from protection, social and
commercial, at the same time that it was enlarging beyond
the European horizon as seen from France. The "European
social model", quite apart from the "Community pre-
ference", was at stake.
The first response here may be to lament the apparent
lack of understanding among citizens as to the realities of
the EU. If there were threats to French employment and
social benefits in 2005 (and there certainly were), they had
nothing to do with the Constitutional Treaty, which primarily
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proposed to change procedures. There is virtually nothing
new in the text concerning substantive policies in economic
or social affairs. If anything, the text goes further in the
direction of social rights with its recognition of the Workers'
right to information and consultation within the undertaking
and the Right of collective bargaining and action, in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights which became the second
part of the Treaty.
The next reaction may be to point to the striking way in
which national debates have highlighted different aspects
of the Treaty. Not only would countries fasten on different
parts of the text. A public message which would tend to
increase support in some countries – such as to insist in
Spain or Belgium that that the constitution was a major step
towards political union –
would produce completely
the opposite reaction in
more Eurosceptic countries
such as the UK.10  And what
the French (and others) per-
ceived as excessive libera-
lism could be seen in the
UK (and elsewhere) as re-
taining too many aspects
of old-style protection ra-
ther than looking to a more
competitive future.
All this then became
associated with wrangling
over the EU's Financial Per-
spective. This had the ne-
gative effect of seeming to
reduce the debate in public
eyes to fights over national
self-interest. It also had the
potentially positive conse-
quence of forcing open
discussion as to what the
European budget was ac-
tually supposed to achieve.
This leads to some
serious reflections and concerns. Many French were voting
about what they saw as the results of European integration
(whether or not they were actually due to European action
or inaction). This is quite understandable. Many of the
recent public campaigns to "sell" Europe emphasise the
material benefits which are promised to derive from
European integration. Yet this is not what the referendum
should have been about.
One of the main aims of the recent exercise has been to
obtain broader consent among the peoples of Europe to
the basic reasons for which the Union exists and the basic
rules by which the Union does things. This is what constitutions
are about, not substantive outcomes. Such settlements are
necessary precisely because there are differences in
preference as to outcomes. "[I]ndividuals may 'agree to
disagree' on distributive issues, because they agree on
some higher order choice rule."11 That kind of genuine
constitutional agreement still needs to be achieved.
Constitutions, as Helen Wallace has pointed out, "if they
are to function successfully, need to be founded on some
set of shared values and to express commitment to some
form of collective identity."12 And, as Fritz Scharpf has
argued:
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One of the main aims has been
to obtain broader consent to
the basic reasons for which the
Union exists and the basic rules
by which the Union does things.
This is what constitutions
are about, not substantive
outcomes. Such settlements are
necessary precisely because
there are differences in
preference as to outcomes.
That kind of genuine
constitutional agreement
still needs to be achieved.E
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"it is only where solidarity on the basis of collective
identity can be presumed to exist in principle among
all concerned that a minority can be asked to respect
majority decisions despite disagreement over impor-
tant issues. These prerequisites for the unitary legiti-
mation of majority decisions are not met at any level
above that of the nation-state; they do not exist in the
European Union, and it will become more and more
difficult to create them as the expansion of the Union
increases the ethnic, cultural and economic hetero-
geneity of its Member States and thus reduces the
possibility of forming an identity."13
A collective identity does not have to be ethno-culturally
based – and it would be dangerous in the European context
to pursue such a vision. A European "demos" could, as
Weiler has proposed, be understood in civic terms as "a
coming together on the basis of shared values, a shared
understanding of rights and societal duties and shared
rational, intellectual culture which transcend ethno-national
differences".14
But how far is it realistic or appropriate to try to identify
values which are uniquely European? A rather extreme
example of such attempts was given in 2004 by Dominique
Strauss-Kahn, Chairman of the Round Table "A sustainable
project for the Europe of
tomorrow" set up at the
initiative of Romano Prodi.
The report proclaims that
"Political Europe is legiti-
mate because Europeans
have a common model of
society". This model, ba-
sed on human rights, cul-
ture, sustainable develop-
ment and multilateralism,
is said to be not only com-
mon but "specific to Eu-
rope".15 This is surely
pushing things a bit.
Rather than relying on
the discourse of shared values, the key may lie, as Stefan
Collignon has recently suggested, in common evaluations:
"In order to make coherent collective choices, there has
to be collective agreement on the values of potential
pay-offs from a chosen policy. Without this epistemic
dimension, policy options would be incommensur-
able…Full epistemic consensus does not necessarily
imply agreement on the evaluative choices or the
distribution of rewards, but simply that there is an
accepted standard to evaluate them."16
The recent arguments over Iraq, the Constitutional Treaty
or the Financial Perspective can easily create the impression
that such basic consensus is uneven, to say the least.
The French referendum focused primarily on concerns
about employment and social policy. In this respect, it
appears that groups of countries have rather different
models reflecting deeply-rooted divergences in terms of
social structure and national preferences. At least three
different models are usually identified, based on Esping-
Andersen's "three worlds of welfare capitalism".17 These
reflect structural differences which correspond to
"fundamentally differing social philosophies which can be
roughly equated with the social philosophies and the post-
war dominance of 'liberal', 'Christian democratic' and
'social democratic' political parties."18  They can be associated
very roughly with different sets of countries – Anglo-Saxon,
continental and Nordic. Some have argued that there is
also a distinctive "southern" model, and others also that
central and eastern Europe may present another distinct set
of features.
Many therefore believe, like Fritz Scharpf, that "uniform
European social policy is not politically feasible or even
desirable". "[U]niform European solutions would mobilize
fierce opposition in countries where they would require
major changes in the structures and core functions of
existing welfare state institutions".19  We may try to cooperate,
to learn from each other, and to promote some general
convergence, through the kind of non-binding mechanisms
known as the open method of coordination. We could
make use of framework directives to provide appropriate
counterparts to market regulation. We will not adopt
uniform policies at European level.
This presents a real dilemma. As was made clear from
the French case, social policies are among the issues of
greatest immediate concern to citizens. They are also those
which still respond to the kind of Left-Right cleavages
underlying most political party systems, and could there-
fore seem likely candida-
tes to be used to generate
public interest along re-
cognisable lines. Yet they
may be precisely issues
which are not the subject
of meaningful choice at
EU level. To present them
– or let them be seen – as
such, may create unneces-
sary frustration as well as
confusion.
For many people, what
has happened is simply
further evidence where
none was needed that
referendums are inappropriate for issues of this scale and
complexity. If it is unrealistic to assume that a reasonable
number of people will be able to make informed yes/no
choices about all significant elements in a text, quite apart
from the challenge of aggregation of all these elements of
evaluation, such a text is in this view unsuitable for approval
by referendum.
This problem was indeed reflected, even if symbolically,
in what happened this time in Portugal. The Portuguese
Constitution states that "Each referendum shall deal with a
single subject; the questions shall be formulated in objective
terms, and clearly and precisely and so as to permit an
answer of yes or no…".20  The Government tried to come up
with a compromise between asking for general approval of
the whole text and looking for specific agreement to details,
by proposing the following wording for the referendum
initially scheduled for April 2005: "Do you agree with the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the rule of qualified majority
voting and the new institutional framework of the EU, as
defined by the European Constitution?" In December 2004,
however, the Portuguese Constitutional Court ruled that
this formulation did not respect the requirements of clarity
and susceptibility to a Yes/No answer. That referendum
was subsequently postponed.
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For many people,
what has happened is
simply further evidence
where none was needed
that referendums are
inappropriate for issues of
this scale and complexity.
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Looking at the French referendum and surrounding debates,
one could get the impression that there was no common
understanding of the implications of the document to be
approved; the issues concerning most of those who voted
were not significantly altered by anything in that document;
and many of those issues are not in fact real European
choices at all.
What to do about it?
The negative referendum results and the low turnout in
Spain, coming on top of the low turnout at the last European
elections, are dishearte-
ning for all those who have
hoped for a more partici-
patory Union. There ap-
pears to be a very low
level of information, inte-
rest and understanding. It
is shocking to read in the
Eurobarometer released
in July 2005 that an
average of 51% of people
say that they know only a
bit about the EU, and another 19% that they know little or
nothing. In other words, a full 70% of the population feel
that they are unable to make any informed choices about
the European Union. This was the first referendum held in
The Netherlands, the first chance for people to express their
feelings about Europe – and feelings they were in most
cases, more than informed judgements – and the majority
reaction was "Nee".
Yet one should not exaggerate Europe's political
legitimacy problem, nor try to make too clear a distinction
between EU and national levels in this respect. As noted
above, for example, non-participation in European elections
is partly related to a feeling of distance from national
political parties; and most citizens are aware that it is the
national governments, parliaments and peoples who have
agreed to the current system. Many citizens may not love the
Union but, with the occasional exception of farmers, people
do not protest in the streets nor threaten disobedience. On
the contrary, they seem to obey rules of European origin just
as much or as little as they do domestic ones. So long as the
Member States are perceived by citizens as being ultimately
in charge, the system as a whole is likely to receive more or
less the same degree of loyalty as do national authorities.
Conversely, if EU affairs are not felt to be of direct
importance, then the EU institutions can get away with quite
a lot of popular non-credibility.
Moreover, it is not necessary for a majority of citizens to
understand the treaties and the decision-making processes
in detail, nor for there to be direct participation by citizens
in political processes, in order for the EU system to be
considered reasonably democratic – if appropriate standards
are applied. EU action is subject to exceptional checks and
balances among multi-level institutions. Democratic over-
sight is provided directly by the European Parliament and
indirectly by elected national officials in the Council. Non-
majoritarian institutions exist in the EU in much the same
areas as they do at national level, and are increasingly
recognised as providing necessary and legitimate elements
of democratic governance, including the role of redressing
biases in national representative practices.21  So, if it isn't
broken, why set out to fix it?
In this kind of perspective, the referendums – and the whole
idea of trying to involve citizens more directly in detailed
decisions and deliberations at European level – have not
only proved to be at best a partial success. They could even
be a mistake with potentially dangerous consequences not
only for ratification of treaties but also for the broader
evolution of popular perceptions of the Union. By trying to
achieve something which is not possible as well as not
necessary – the informed direct participation of citizens in
the detail of EU decision-making – while implying that
European democracy depends on the result, the inevitable
result may be to create an impression of illegitimacy even
where this is not war-
ranted.
This is in no way meant
as an argument against
promoting citizens' parti-
cipation in EU affairs (and
in all other public sphe-
res). It is a plea to think
about how one could em-
power citizens to give their
informed consent to the
basic reasons, rules and
procedures involved – which is what I mean by a new kind
of "permissive consensus" – instead of pursuing a dream of
"direct democracy" over details in a Union of half a billion
people.
What might this mean in practice? In order to think
about possible next steps, one may use the following as
starting points.
• The Constitutional Treaty in its present form is dead.
There seems little prospect of successfully re-running the
referendums in France or The Netherlands with the
same text. Even if this were to happen, it currently seems
probable that the treaty would be rejected in the UK and
perhaps elsewhere too, since it seems unlikely that
people would accept that the same treaty should now be
ratified without referendums where referendums were
promised this time. Something has to change.
• Referendums will take place again in the future.
Whatever one's judgement about the suitability of
referendums for such issues, it would be unrealistic to
propose that no referendums should be held over EU
reforms. Quite apart from national traditions, in a few
Member States there is a constitutional obligation to
hold a binding referendum if constitutional amendment
is required. And politically, after all that has happened,
there will be strong pressure in many countries to hold
referendums on further changes.
• People expect responses to what has happened which
convince them they are taken seriously.
Something should and can be done now as a sort of
demonstration exercise in the logic of European inte-
gration. Quite apart from the fact that referendums will
not go away, people will not forget the failure or
suspension of referendums in 2005. In order to create
a new permissive consensus, some steps have to be
taken at this stage to build that higher-order consensus,
and to restore a minimum degree of trust.
This is important now in order to ease the so-called (and
probably exaggerated) "constitutional crisis". Looking ahead,
it may well seem appropriate in a few years to attempt
again an overall simplification/constitutionalisation of the
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Union's treaty bases, as well as of its institutions and
procedures. The challenge is to ensure that – by that time
– interested citizens will feel that they can support such a
move, not necessarily on the basis of detailed understanding
of the relevant text, but at least in terms of positive
responses to two implicit questions: a) do you trust those
who negotiated it and, above all, those who are to execute
it? and b) do you give
your general consent to
the fundamental rules and
procedures involved?
This also entails ma-
king clear not only that
the referendum concerns
rules and procedures
rather than substantive
outcomes, but also indi-
cating the scope of the
substantive spheres which
are potentially subject to
those rules. This does not
necessarily mean pre-
senting a simple "catalo-
gue of competences" and
it certainly does not mean trying to move towards any
simple division of powers. On the contrary, it requires
explaining the basic rationale of European multi-level
governance, and trying to present as simple as possible a
picture of what is and is not affected.
All this needs to be well prepared, starting now. Three
lines of action suggest themselves.
Communications strategies and
educational programmes
The first, uncontroversial and also undervalued, is to invest
much more time, resources and political attention in com-
munications strategies and basic educational programmes
about European integration. It will be worth it in the long
run, not only to help ensure the stability and effectiveness
of the Union and its policies, but also as a contribution to
the overall development of democratic governance in
Europe. Since it is through the national (and regional) prism
that most people perceive Europe, the burden of this effort
lies with national (and regional) actors.
Tangible changes and model debates
The second is to go ahead with a small number of the
changes foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty. The idea
here is emphatically not to engage in stealthy cherry-
picking – that is, secretively slipping through a few favoured
changes in the context of, say, an accession treaty with
Croatia. On the contrary, the aim would be precisely the
opposite, namely to use consideration of these changes as
a sort of "model debate" intended deliberately to engage
the public. Two candidates suggest themselves, each having
the potential to illustrate a different side of the general
question, and both having the advantage of depending
much less on an overall "package" agreement than, say, the
reduction of the number of Commissioners (even though
such a reduction would in fact be technically possible on the
basis of the Nice Protocol.)
One could demonstrate a logic of collective action in
substantive policy areas. This would mean proposing treaty
amendments in an area which is of high priority and
salience, and where the amendments can most clearly be
debated publicly as options for collective problem-solving
in the spirit of subsidiarity. Proposals for change could
clearly take the form of arguments to show that existing
structures and practices are dysfunctional for the
achievement of shared objectives, and are so to an extent
that outweighs the sove-
reignty/subsidiarity costs
of joint action. An obvious
candidate is the possible
transformation of the EU's
current provisions con-
cerning Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal
Matters.22 Another might
concern the specific role
of parliaments in Euro-
pean governance. This
could take the form of a
loose package including
two main elements: on
the one hand, the streng-
thened role foreseen for
national parliaments in controlling respect for subsidiarity,
through the right to give a subsidiarity-opinion on legislative
proposals; and on the other, the change foreseen concerning
the role of the European Parliament in overseeing, together
with the Council, the Commission's powers of adapting and
applying legislation. This issue would have the further
benefit of involving an active participation in the debate on
the part of all parliaments and political parties.
Basic principles and detailed agreements
The third line of action would in effect broaden this last idea,
and responds to a basic Euro-constitutionalist question of
today: how can one realistically reconcile the idea of
European peoples' giving their consent to basic reasons
and rules, with the continuing need for European states to
reach formal agreements over detailed content and
procedures? Could one not seek a reasoned popular
mandate of appropriate level by some sort of pan-European
Declaration of Principles, which would serve as a framework
for subsequent changes?
This would essentially mean picking up the idea of
separating a "Constitution", consisting of a short statement
of principles, from the set of detailed rules contained in the
treaties, but with some fundamental differences. The
declaration of principles proposed as a first stage should
not pose as a Constitution in anything resembling the
national sense. It should be a declaration approved by non-
binding referendum on the same day in every country which
would, while not being legally binding under international
law, provide mutually-agreed political guidelines within
which negotiations should take place. The detailed rules
would then be agreed in a second stage.
In contrast to recent proposals for a short text with this
aim, which would be limited to most of the first Part of the
Constitutional Treaty but include the main institutional
innovations, such a Declaration would aim at higher-order
principles, and try also to give reasons. And it would include
an explicit recognition of the right of national governments
to negotiate within the framework agreed, as well as the
responsibility of national parliaments in particular to check
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In order to create a new
permissive consensus,
some steps have to
be taken at this stage
to build that higher-order
consensus, and to
restore a minimum
degree of trust.E
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from the national perspective that the principles are
respected.
There is no rush to re-run the referendums nor to rewrite
the Treaties. The Union can survive without a President of
the European Council or a new voting system. Time is
required to settle down and move on. At the same time,
however, a political response must be seen to be given fairly
quickly after what has happened in the failed referendums,
and serious proposals for the next stage need to be
prepared now in order to prevent a really deep crisis from
happening later. ::
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